Is Ukraine Losing the War?

Alina Frolova, Deputy Chairman of the Center for Defense Strategies

Western public discourse is increasingly dominated by the idea that Ukraine is losing the war and should pursue a peace deal to avoid further losses. This perception likely arises from a disproportionate focus on visible land domain operations, which tend to dominate media coverage and are easier to follow.

Yet wars are won with strategies, not tactics. And in this area, Ukraine can demonstrate a clear path to holding Russia on the battlefield while inflicting what will ultimately prove to be unbearable losses. If that sounds questionable, remember that 12 days before Bashar al-Assad’s fall his regime looked absolutely secure.

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has passed through several stages over the last 11 years. Contrary to the common belief that the conflict began in 2022, its origins trace back to 2014. It started with initial Ukrainian losses on the battlefield (and in Western public opinion, where few recognized the possibilities for pan-European destabilization) followed by a low-intensity, almost frozen conflict after the Minsk Agreements of September 2014.

Since the all-out war was launched in February 2022, despite evolving battlefield dynamics and changing tactics on both sides, the conflict remains attritional at the strategic level. This is not surprising, as most conventional wars oscillate between attrition, maneuver, and reconstitution. Both Ukraine and Russia have faced severe blows to manpower and equipment, with neither side capable of executing large-scale combined-arms maneuvers to mitigate them. In other words, even when Russia does pass through Ukrainian lines, it lacks the forces to exploit its advantage to decisive, war-winning effect.

So what is Ukraine’s situation? To assess this, it is crucial to take a strategic, multidomain view of the conflict.

Multidomain Warfare: Ukraine’s Strategic Position.

Modern wars, as recognized by advanced military doctrines like NATO’s, unfold across multiple domains: land, air, sea, space, cyberspace, and the cognitive sphere. Ukraine’s war with Russia is no exception, encompassing all these dimensions. Surprisingly, Ukraine is prevailing in at least four domains and contesting Russia in the remaining two. Here is a strategic overview of the most principal ones:

Air Domain

Air superiority is critical to winning wars. Despite significantly smaller air capabilities, Ukraine has effectively neutralized Russia’s air superiority. Russian air forces cannot operate in-depth and, as stated by UK intelligence, lack a decisive operational effect because of Ukrainian air defense systems, an increased presence of Ukrainian air forces, effective long-range strikes at critical Russian air force infrastructure and a new air dominance concept based on rapidly developing drones and UAV technology.

As a result, in early autumn 2024, the White House stated that Russia had moved 90% of its warplanes beyond the 300km (186 mile) range of ATACMS ballistic missiles and that the frequency of Russian air strikes and the deployment of guided glide bombs, which were one of the key components in the land offensive operations, have decreased by as much as 75% in some frontline areas.

Sea Domain

The situation in the Black Sea is so clear that it needs little rehearsing. Russia has lost over one-third of its Black Sea fleet, losses that military experts consider critical, rendering it incapable of fulfilling its operational functions. Ukraine has inflicted critical losses which led to a degradation of most of Russia’s principal capabilities, including amphibious operations (more than 50% of amphibious assault ship destroyed or substantially damaged, marine units almost completely “renewed” three times over), and has lost its maritime operation capabilities, several of its naval bases and trade route protection capabilities, and can no longer blockade Ukrainian ports. In December 2023, Russia relocated most of its crucial ships including 10 Kalibr missiles carriers from Crimea ports to Novorossiysk in order to shelter them from Ukraine’s attacks. So, Russia’s maritime strategy is in disarray, effectively nullifying its dominance in the wider region (which has already been reflected in Syria).

Space and Cyber Domains

Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable adaptability in the space and cyber domains. Lacking state-of-the-art tools, the country has leveraged partnerships and a whole-of-society approach to cyber resilience. It utilizes satellite data from partners and commercial sources funded by citizens, ensuring robust governmental and financial services. Meanwhile, Russia struggles with a monopolized and rigid system lacking public initiative and resilience.

Land Domain

While traditionally considered Ukraine’s weakest point, the land domain reveals a more nuanced picture. Since the full-scale invasion in 2022, Ukraine has liberated approximately 75,000 sq km and launched limited incursions into Russian territory in the Kursk region (where it currently holds around 800 sq km.) In contrast, Russia gained just 505 sq km in 2023 and around 4,000 sq km in 2024, mainly through costly “human waves” tactics that have, in total, cost it around 700,000 dead and wounded.

These operations are obviously politically driven, since they require a primitive waste of resources, human and otherwise, and are unsustainable. The area of the frontline where active operations are underway has narrowed from 1,300 km in 2023 to 970km in 2024, reflecting a shift in dynamics.

Who Has the Upper Hand?

In a war of attrition, logistical sustainability is decisive. Russia’s logistics have been weak from the start, and rely heavily on railways. While a well-developed railway network in occupied Ukrainian Donbas has favored a Russian advance, this will be a dwindling asset as its forces move further away from the railheads.

Supply routes inside Russia have been targeted by long-range strikes on hubs, munition depots, and production sites. Russia’s inability to protect its territory — a consequence of its offensive-oriented military doctrine — further exacerbates these vulnerabilities.

In contrast, defense production for Ukraine is mainly safe from Russian attacks because most factories are located abroad; Ukraine’s logistics and supply are bolstered by international partnerships and decentralized domestic production. High-tech defense manufacturing has surged, supported by private initiatives and Western investment. Ukraine’s air defense generally outperforms Russia’s, protecting key assets and production lines.

Defense Production Trends

Despite numerous statements that Russia spends about 8% of GDP on defense, the Kremlin could provide tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery by withdrawing and restoring equipment manufactured in the Soviet era. Its defense production has been hard hit and Russian output numbers, for example of tanks, are highly suspect. Its ability to sustain its military is dwindling.

Tanks, artillery, and other critical equipment are being depleted faster than they can be replaced. OSINT data suggests that Russia’s stockpiles of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles may be exhausted by 2027, with artillery and rocket launchers running out in 2025-2026. Sanctions and a lack of innovation hinder Russia’s capacity to modernize its arsenal. Add in the analytical prognoses on Russia’s economic stagflation in the second half of 2025, and even with supplies from Iran and North Korea, its situation doesn’t look good. 

Ukraine, on the other hand, has dramatically increased its defense production (from 1.3 billion hryvnia in 2022 to 20 billion hryvnia ($474m) in 2024), supported by EU investments. Moreover, Ukraine’s economy, despite severe losses, demonstrates resilience, with forecasts predicting GDP growth of 2.5%—7% in 2025, combined with quite a limited inflation, a high level of National Bank reserves, and stable banking system. Western financial support ensures a stable fiscal foundation, contrasting sharply with Russia’s economic fragility and declining defense production capacity.

Demographic and Historical Context

Russia’s demographic advantage (a population of 149 million compared to Ukraine’s 38–42 million) is frequently cited as a factor in its favor. But smaller nations can prevail against larger adversaries — as seen in the Israeli War of Independence and the Korean War, for example. Tactics, morale, local knowledge, diplomacy, and technical innovation can all play important roles in securing victory. And the Ukrainian population, regardless of all its problems, clearly demonstrates high resilience, innovation, and an ability and will to fight.

Conclusion

While Ukraine faces significant challenges, the strategic picture indicates that it is not losing the war. Attritional warfare favors the side with better long-term sustainability, logistics, and innovation. Russia’s critical vulnerabilities in logistics, production, and economic resilience place it at a disadvantage.

Ukraine, supported by its partners, demonstrates superior performance across multiple domains and shows no signs of imminent collapse. This year will just simply underline those trends.

The only pathway to Russian victory lies in undermining Western resolve and fostering the illusion of Russian strength. By maintaining strategic focus and sustaining international support, Ukraine has every chance to prevail.