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Russia’s war on Ukraine. 23.03.2024

In the operational zone of the Ukrainian Operational-Strategic Group of Forces (OSG) “Khortytsia” on the Kupyansk direction, the enemy, supported by aviation, attempted three unsuccessful assaults on Defense Forces positions in the areas of Synkivka, Tabaivka, and Berestove. On the Lyman direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 7 enemy attacks in the areas of Bilohorivka and Spirne, where the enemy attempted to break through the defense with aviation support. On the Bakhmut direction, they repelled 5 Russian attacks in the areas of Ivanivske, Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.

On the Avdiivka direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 10 enemy attacks in the area of Berdychi, Tonenke, Pervomaiske and Nevelske. On the Novopavlivka direction, they continued to hold back the enemy in the areas of Krasnohorivka, Heorhiivka, Novomykhailivka, Vodyane, and Urozhaine, where the enemy, with air support, attempted to breach the defense 28 times. On the Orikhiv direction, the enemy with air support attacked the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces 10 times in the areas of Staromayorske, south of Novodarivka, and near Robotyne.

On the Kherson direction, the enemy remains determined to dislodge the units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces from the bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro and made 2 unsuccessful assaults.

General conclusion:

  • The enemy is making efforts to shift the line of contact towards vital transit and logistical hubs amidst the reduced readiness of the Ukrainian Defense Forces to defend them, thereby increasing the risks for Ukrainian rear areas.
  • The Russian military command is focusing its efforts on the Lyman, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka directions, aiming to sustain the offensive momentum and maintain initiative on the theater of operations. However, the composition and quality of Russian forces on the Avdiivka direction underscore a distinct prioritization by the Russian military command on this front.
  • The enemy is conducting parallel offensive operations on 5-7 sectors, varying their intensity. The total length of these sectors does not exceed 100 km. Tactical and operational reserves are being deployed for ongoing offensive operations, aiming to destabilize the defense and prevent Ukraine from regaining respite.
  • Russian forces are conducting an offensive operation on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, attempting to reach the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast. However, even if these efforts achieve their intended goal, the prospects for Russian advancement in Kharkiv Oblast from the eastern bank of the Oskil River are as challenging as those in other areas along the international border with the Belgorod region.
  • The Russian military command has not formed strategic reserves capable of facilitating two or more offensive operations by its groupings of forces.
  • Currently, the Ukrainian Defense Forces are optimizing their military organizational structures to streamline and maximize the quality and effectiveness of command and control (C2) and troop management. The reorganization of specific operational-strategic groupings, operational groupings, and force groups is anticipated.
  • The Defense Forces have begun to regroup and withdraw a number of brigades from unspecified positions to restore their combat readiness, indicating a stabilization of the situation on the line of contact.
  • The additional aid package from the United States will provide the Ukrainian Defense Forces with the opportunity to gain time to tackle systemic personnel recruitment issues.
  • The capabilities of enemy military reconnaissance in the tactical depth of the Ukrainian Defense Forces (up to 20 km) have significantly increased.
  • The cycle from target detection to its engagement has greatly accelerated, allowing for the creation of an effective kill chain.
  • The enemy has managed to deploy and maintain in readiness an aerial observation system over the tactical zone of the Ukrainian Defense Forces.
  • The Ukrainian Defense Forces keenly feel the shortage of personnel, ammunition, radars, and anti-aircraft missile systems.
  • The enemy conducted the largest combined strike since February 2022, using 63 UAVs and 88 missiles of various types, targeting 136 objects of Ukraine’s energy system and damaging dozens of them. The Russian Aerospace Forces attacked energy facilities in the Zaporizhzhia, Khmelnytskyi, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Mykolaiv, Vinnytsia, Lviv, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts.
  • There are no signs indicating that Russian forces are currently preparing for an offensive operation to encircle the city of Kharkiv.
  • The actions of the Russian Volunteer Corps, the “Svobodnaya Rossiya” legion, and the Siberian Battalion on the territory of the Russian Federation have somehow contributed to stabilizing the line of contact in Ukraine.

Change in the line of contact (LoC):

  • There have been 69 combat engagements on various fronts.
  • On the Kupyansk direction, the Russian authorities ordered the evacuation of civilians from the areas of Dunayka, Spodaryushyne, Hrayvoron, Horkovsky, Nekhoteyevka, and Nova Tavolzhanka (RF territory). Part of the Russian forces (primarily from the composition of the 1st Tank Army and the 11th Army Corps) were relocated to the Belgorod region, which slowed down the pace of the enemy advance towards Synkivka and the progress along the Kupyansk-Svatove road in the northwest direction.
  • Russian volunteer units entered Tetkino and blew up the enemy’s ammunition depot. These formations are not only conducting raid actions but also attempting to hold control of some of the captured settlements. They are countered by the 2nd Separate SOF Brigade with support from units of the Russian National Guard. The enemy command’s lack of manpower is compensated by a large number of air and artillery strikes.
  • Positional battles took place in the areas of Synkivka, Tabaivka, and Berestove.
  • The situation on the Kupyansk direction is dynamic, as the intensity of Russian assaults varies daily.
  • On the Lyman direction, Russian forces are continuously launching a large number of attacks. The enemy’s “Zapad” operational grouping is concentrating efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian foothold on the Chornyi Zherebets River.
  • From the eastern direction, the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, along with the 254th and 488th Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Army, are attempting to break through to Terny. The 31st Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 19th Tank Regiment of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division of the 25th Army, reinforced by the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 47th Tank Division of the 1st Tank Army are attempting to break through to Yampolivka. The enemy launched massive attacks on the position of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, utilizing DesertCross Chinese-made quad bikes. Units of the 100th Separate Mechanized Brigade and the 81st Separate Air Assault Brigade repelled the enemy attacks with the extensive use of FPV drones.
  • On the Bakhmut direction, the enemy’s military command is focused on breaking through to the Siversky Donets-Donbas Canal and reaching the outskirts of Chasiv Yar. Advancing towards Chasiv Yar are the 98th Airborne Division, the 11th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade, the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division of the 8th Army, reinforced by several regiments of the Russian Territorial Troops and units of the “7th Volunteer Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade ‘Veterans’.” This grouping, attempting to flank and encircle the “Khortytsia” OSG units defending in the area of Klishchiivka-Andriivka, is coordinating with the 3rd Army Corps, which is trying to push back the Ukrainian Defense Forces from the same area, advancing from the eastern direction. Direct frontal attacks by the 98th Airborne Division on Bohdanivka and Ivanivske are ongoing, but the enemy has not succeeded in breaking through to Stupochky. The 2nd and 3rd Army Corps of the enemy have mostly depleted their personnel and are manned with Territorial Troops units by more than 70-80%.
  • On the Avdiivka direction, Russian forces have advanced in the area of Tonenke, although the 53rd Separate Mechanized Brigade of the “Tavriya” OSG has inflicted significant losses on the enemy in this area, extensively using FPV drones. Positional battles were ongoing in the areas of Novobakhmutivka, Berdychi, Semenivka, Orlivka, and Pervomaiske.
  • On the Novopavlivka direction, Russian forces have advanced in the southern part of Novomykhailivka. Positional battles were taking place near Krasnohorivka, Heorhiivka, Novomykhailivka, and Vodyane. Near Pobieda, combat actions are being conducted by units of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division of the 8th Army.
  • On the Berdyansk direction, the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division of the 5th Army has advanced to the west of Staromayorske. Positional battles were ongoing in the areas of Volodymyrivka, Staromayorske, and Urozhaine. In the same area, combat actions are being conducted by the 14th Separate SOF Brigade of the enemy.
  • On the Orikhiv direction, units of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 58th Army have advanced near Robotyne, while the 247th Air Assault Regiment of the 7th Air Assault Division attacked northwest of Verbove.
  • The 3rd Battalion “Bulava” of the Separate Presidential Brigade forced the enemy to retreat 300 meters from Robotyne.
  • In the Black Sea-Azov naval operational area, the enemy naval group on combat duty consisted of:
    • Mediterranean Sea: 2 ships, including 1 carrier of Kalibr cruise missiles, with a total salvo of 8 Kalibr missiles.

Changes in the enemy disposition:

  • The enemy forces have received the compact reconnaissance complex “Strelets,” which allows marking the adversary’s location on a tablet and highlighting targets for aviation.
  • Russian forces have concentrated approximately 100,000 personnel along the Kharkiv-Luhansk line, around 50,000 near Bakhmut, over 50,000 near Avdiivka, and are attempting to concentrate a grouping of approximately 50,000 personnel in Zaporizhzhia direction. The most likely purpose of these groupings is to replenish units that are losing combat capability, although the formation of strike groups is also not ruled out.
  • In the event of mobilization by the Russian Federation without demobilization of those conscripted in 2022 and 2023, tension between newly mobilized individuals and those previously mobilized should be expected. If demobilization of those conscripted in previous years occurs and they are replaced, tension will arise between volunteers with indefinite contracts and those who were conscripted alongside them but will be discharged. Another focal point of tension is the conflicts between servicemen who have been on the front lines for a long time and those who were conscripted later, as well as those who will be conscripted in 2024.

Possible operation situation developments:

  • The likely operational-strategic objectives of the Russian troop grouping in the theater of military operations could include the seizure of the Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts within their administrative borders.
  • The battles for Terny and Yampolivka will persist for a while, yet it is evident that the enemy will succeed in cutting off the Nevske-Torske road along the left bank of the Chornyi Zherebets River from north to south, likely in the area of Terny. The southern part of the foothold on the Chornyi Zherebets River will be eliminated by the enemy in the near future.
  • The Ukrainian Defense Forces maintain control of the final agglomeration (Slovyansk-Kramatorsk) in Donetsk Oblast; the strategic importance of the “Zapad (West)” operational grouping in the adversary’s offensive campaign in 2024 is notably heightened.
  • The adversary’s command will commit the 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 90th Tank Division in the direction of Berdychi or Novobakhmutivka.
  • The command of the 58th Army is poised to deploy the 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade into the operation northwest of Robotyne, aiming to bypass this defensive node of the Ukrainian OSG “Tavria” from the north and cut off the Robotyne-Novodanylivka road.
  • The Ukrainian Defense Forces will make efforts to stabilize the front line and ensure an operational pause for 3-4 months to rearm and replenish personnel to a minimum of 150-200 thousand servicemen.
  • The Ukrainian Defense Forces will intensify attacks using long-range UAVs to target objects in the operational and strategic rear of the Russian Federation, primarily focusing on important targets such as oil and gas facilities, depots, pipelines, military airfields, factories producing dual-use goods, and war-related infrastructure.

Russian operational losses from 24.02.22 to 23.03.24 

Personnel – almost 435,760  people (+1,050);

Tanks – 6,852 (+12);

Armored combat vehicles – 13,130 (+19);

Artillery systems – 10,811 (+36);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) – 1,018 (0);

Anti-aircraft warfare systems – 723 (0);

Vehicles and fuel tanks – 14,344 (+57);

Aircraft – 347 (0);

Helicopters – 325 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 8,463 (+75);

Intercepted cruise missiles – 1,992 (+39);

Boats/ships – 27 (0).


Humanitarian+general:

  • According to information provided by the Situation Center of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Russian troops shelled 11 regions of Ukraine over the past day. A total of 145 towns and villages and 98 infrastructure objects were attacked with various types of weapons. The number of casualties is being updated/clarified.
  • During the night of March 23, Russian forces launched four S-300 guided missiles at Donetsk Oblast and 34 Shahed UAVs. Ukrainian air defense forces successfully destroyed 31 Russian Shahed drones.
  • During a subsequent Russian attack at midnight in Kharkiv, a rescuer and a police officer who arrived at the site of impact were injured, and vehicles belonging to the State Emergency Service sustained damage.
  • Due to the damage to the Dnipro Hydroelectric Power Plant (DniproHES), Ukraine’s Ukrenergo lost 20% of its regulating capacities. Currently, DniproHES is not generating electricity, and the timeline for its restoration is uncertain. Assessments of the losses are ongoing.
  • The Ministry of Energy’s press service reports that electricity supply has been restored in Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts. However, in case of increased consumption in Odesa, additional restrictions may be imposed. In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, electricity supply has been restored to all consumers, including full recovery in Kryvyi Rih. In Khmelnytskyi Oblast, all consumers have electricity, but additional restrictions may be implemented if consumption increases.
  • In Kharkiv, the situation with restoring electricity supply after the March 22 massive Russian attack is the most challenging compared to all other regions. Over the past day, approximately 16,500 people visited 149 resilience centers in Kharkiv Oblast.
  • Around 10 am, the enemy dropped an explosive device from a drone onto a “resilience point” in one of the villages of the Novooleksandrivska community, injuring two civilians.
  • Due to the security situation, children are being evacuated from three villages in the Shostka district of Sumy Oblast. A total of 54 children, along with their parents or other legal guardians, are planned to be evacuated.
  • Between March 15th and 22nd, demining teams from the Ministry of Defense disposed of 5,522 explosive devices in liberated areas of Ukraine.

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