Russia’s war on Ukraine. 02.05.2024

In the operational zone of the Ukrainian Operational-Strategic Group of Forces (OSG) “Khortytsia”, on the Kupyansk direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 14 enemy attacks in the areas of Petropavlivka, Ivanivka, Kyslivka, Kotlyarivka, Berestove, Kopanky, and Stelmakhivka. On the Lyman direction, they repelled 14 attacks in the areas of Hrekivka, Novoyehorivka, Nevske, Terny, and Serebriansk Forest. On the Bakhmut direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 20 Russian attacks in the areas of Bilohorivka, Verkhnyokamianske, Spirne, Novyi. 

In the “Tavriya” OSG operational zone on the Avdiivka direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 39 enemy attacks in the areas of Kalynove, Arkhanhelske, Prohres, Ocheretyne, Sokil, Solovyove, Novopokrovske, Semenivka, Umanske, Yasnobrodivka, Netaylove, and Pervomaiske. On the Novopavlivka direction, they continued to hold back the enemy in the areas of Krasnohorivka, Heorhiivka, Novomykhailivka, Vodyane, and Urozhaine, where the adversary, supported by aviation, attempted to breach Ukrainian troops’ defenses 22 times. On the Orikhiv direction, the enemy, supported by aviation, attacked the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces 2 times in the area of Staromayorske and Robotyne.

In the operational zone of the “Odesa” OSG on the Kherson direction, the enemy remains determined to dislodge the units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces from the bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro River and launched 9 unsuccessful attacks.

General conclusion: 

• The adversary has initiated the relocation of the 76th and 7th Air Assault Divisions from the Orikhiv direction to Avdiivka to either reinforce the enemy’s “Tsentr (Center) Operational Grouping or to Bakhmut to bolster the enemy’s “Yug (South)” Operational Grouping in the area of Chasiv Yar, taking advantage of the time it takes for military support to arrive from partner logistics hubs.
• The enemy’s military command seeks to exploit a deep penetration into the “Tavriya” OSG’s tactical defense zone northwest Avdiivka to expand the breakthrough sector and intensify pressure on the Ukrainian Defense Forces in Chasiv Yar.
• The proliferation of so-called “turtle tanks” within the adversary’s operational zone suggests that the Russian defense industry has failed to develop a protective system for armored objects capable of defending against FPV drone strikes. Electronic Warfare Systems “Lesochek” and “Volnorez” have proven ineffective against Ukrainian Defense Forces UAVs, while more effective systems “Troyka” and “Ogonek” are too expensive.

Change in the line of contact (LoC):

• There were 121 combat engagements on various fronts.
• On the Kupyansk direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled Russian attacks near Ivanivka, Kyslivka, Kotlyarivka, Berestove, Stelmakhivka, near Kopanky, close to Novoyehorivka, Hrekivka, Makiivka, and Nevske..
• On the Lyman direction, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled enemy attacks near Terny, Bilohorivka, and in the area of Serebriansk Forest. The Ukrainian Defense Forces launched a group missile strike using ATACMS missiles on the enemy concentration area southwest of Mozhnyakivka (80 km behind the front line). Estimated enemy losses amount to 116 killed.
• On the Bakhmut direction, the battles continued near Verkhnyokamianske, Spine, and Rozdolivka.
• Russian forces advanced through the forest directly east of Chasiv Yar and further along the outskirts of the “Kanal” neighborhood. The 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 14th Army Corps of the Northern Fleet advanced near Bohdanivka, while the 98th Airborne Division and the 11th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade reached the eastern bank of the Siversky Donets-Donbas Canal, south of Chasiv Yar.
• The fighting persisted near Bohdanivka, in the “Kanal” and “Novyi” neighborhoods, Klishchiivka, Andriivka, Shumy, and New York.
• On the Avdiivka direction, Russian forces have advanced southwest and west of Solovyove, with the 55th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 41st Army moving further into the Sokil area. Russian troops have also advanced in the fields southwest and northwest of Ocheretyne, west of Novokalynove, northwest of Keramik, and east of Novooleksandrivka. Battles also occurred near Kalynove, Prohres, Novopokrovske, Berdychi, Semenivka, Umanske, Yasnobrodivka, and Netaylove.
• On the Novopavlivka direction, Russian forces are attempting to gain control of Paraskeviivka, with the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division attacking Heorhiivka. The enemy advanced in the fields southwest of Novomykhailivka and north of Volodymyrivka. Battles have been ongoing near Krasnohorivka, Novomykhailivka, and Vodyane.
• On the Berdyansk direction, Russian forces have advanced in the southern part of Urozhaine, moving up to 800 m deep and on the front of up to 4 km wide, and up to 400 m deep and 1.5 km wide near Novodonetske. Battles have been ongoing near Staromayorske.
• On the Orikhiv direction, Russian forces are attempting to capture Robotyne. Positional battles have been ongoing near Bylohirya and Mala Tokmachka.
• In the Black Sea-Azov naval operational area, the enemy naval group on combat duty consists of:
  • Mediterranean Sea: 2 ships, including 1 “Kalibr” sea launched cruise missile carrier. The total salvo is 16 cruise missiles.

Changes in the enemy disposition:

• The enemy’s 10th Separate SOF Brigade is active near Chasiv Yar.
• The enemy’s 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army is advancing near Vuhledar.
• According to Ukrainian Military Intelligence, as of the end of April 2024, the enemy has amassed around 40 hypersonic “Zircon” missiles, 400 anti-ship “Oniks” missiles, 270 “Kalibr” cruise missiles, and 45 Kh-69 cruise missiles. The Russian defense industry’s production capacity for missiles within 30 days is estimated at: 10 “Zircon” missiles, 10 “Oniks” missiles, 30-40 “Kalibr” missiles, and 1-3 Kh-69 missiles.

Escalation indicators:

• The enemy is intensifying its efforts in the vicinity of Ocheretyne and increasing pressure on the flanks of this breach.

Possible operation situation developments:

• The forces of the 20th and 25th Army are unable to complete the forming operation on the Lyman direction and will not be able to occupy a favorable starting position for the offensive on Lyman and the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration before the beginning of summer.
• The adversary may attempt to bypass Chasiv Yar without directly assaulting the city, by operating from the south and southeast, while simultaneously forming a northern flank for the Toretsk operation. Russian forces may decide to advance north of the salient near Ocheretyne along the N20 Donetsk-Kostyantynivka highway to put pressure on the Ukrainian Defense Forces defending in the area of Toretsk, and possibly threaten the “Tavriya” OSG operational rear and the areas west of Chasiv Yar.
• The “Center” Operational Grouping command is focused on executing the following operational plan: to establish conditions for the blockade and encirclement of the Kurakhove area or to create advantageous circumstances for launching an offensive operation to encircle “Tavriya” OSG’s defense in Toretsk area from the south.
• The enemy’s “Vostok” Operational Grouping is gearing up for active operations on the southern flank of the Kurakhove-Vuhledar bulge of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in coordination with the left flank of the “Yug” Operational Grouping, which is currently attempting to break through towards Kurakhove through Hryhorivka and Paraskoviivka-Kostyantynivka along the Vovcha and Sukhi Yaly Rivers.
• The isolation or complete capture of Kostyantynivka will significantly impair the Defense Forces’ ability to maintain the frontline in the southern part of Donetsk Oblast, as it will disrupt the main logistical route along Highway N-20.
• In the imminent timeframe, the adversary will attempt to reach the Stara Mykolaivka-Sukha Balka line.

Russian operational losses from 24.02.22 to 05.01.24  

Personnel – almost 470,870 (+1030); 

Tanks 7,332 (+20); 

Armored combat vehicles – 14,096 (+29); 

Artillery systems – 12,044 (+20);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) – 1,053 (0);

Anti-aircraft warfare systems – 784 (+4);

Vehicles and fuel tanks – 16,224 (+49);

Aircraft – 348 (0);

Helicopters – 325 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 9,561 (+23);

Intercepted cruise missiles – 2,126 (0);

Boats/ships – 27 (0).

Humanitarian+general:

• According to information provided by the Situation Center of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Russian forces shelled 10 regions of Ukraine over the past day. A total of 105 towns and villages and 143 infrastructure objects were attacked with various types of weapons. 8 people were killed, and 23 others injured as a result of Russian shelling in Donetsk and Kharkiv Oblasts. The number of casualties is being updated/clarified.
• In April 2024, Russia launched over 300 missiles of various types, nearly 300 Shahed kamikaze drones, and more than 3200 guided aerial bombs against peaceful Ukrainians, according to President Volodymyr Zelensky.
• As a result of a Russian ballistic missile attack on Odesa late in the evening on May 1, civilian infrastructure, including postal warehouses, was damaged. The number of wounded is reported to be 14 people.
• In the afternoon of May 2, Russian forces launched a glide bomb strike on civilian infrastructure in Derhachi, Kharkiv District. According to preliminary information, eight children who were in a sports club, as well as a 75-year-old man, were injured. Morning attacks on Kharkiv Oblast injured 2 people.
• The international human rights organization Human Rights Watch has found that since December 2023, Russian occupiers have allegedly executed at least 15 Ukrainian servicemen during attempts to surrender, and possibly six more who surrendered or were captured.
• According to the Center for National Resistance of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the Russian occupying administration is forcibly moving residents of Hola Prystan, Kokhani, and Hladkivka in Kherson Oblast using buses confiscated from schools and automotive enterprises. The people are temporarily relocated to the south of Kherson Oblast and Crimea. Their new accommodation is deliberately overcrowded and in poor condition to continue to encourage relocation to Russia and to persuade men to enlist in the Russian military. The occupants prohibit the local residents from taking any bulky items with them and allow only hand luggage.

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