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Russia’s war on Ukraine. 26.10.24

In the operational zone of the Ukrainian Operational Group of Forces (OTG) “Kharkiv” on the Kharkiv direction, Russian forces launched 4 attacks near Vovchansk.

In the “Khortytsia” Operational-Strategic Group of Forces (OSG) operational zone on the Kupyansk direction, there were 17 assaults near Holubivka, Stepova Novoselivka, and Vyshneve. On the Lyman direction, the enemy attacked 24 times, attempting to advance near six villages, focusing efforts around Hrekivka, Terny, Torske, and the Serebriansk Forest. On the Siversk direction, Russian forces tried to advance 6 times near Ivano-Dariivka and Vyimka; all attacks were repelled, and the enemy achieved no success. On the Kramatorsk direction, enemy forces attacked near Chasiv Yar, while on the Toretsk direction, the enemy conducted 3 attacks on Toretsk with air support.

In the “Tavriya” OSG operational zoneon the Pokrovsk direction,Ukrainian Defense Forces stopped 46 assaults near Lysivka, Selydove, and Myrolyubivka. On the Kurakhove direction, Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 41 attacks near Hostre, Katerynivka, and Novodmytrivka. On the Vremivka direction, the enemy launched 22 assaults near Bohoyavlenka and Novoukrainka. On the Orikhiv direction, Russian forces did not carry out assault actions but shelled residential areas using all available weapons and conducted airstrikes.

In the operational zone of “Odesa” OSG on the Prydniprovskyi direction, Russian occupiers attacked 3 times, met fierce resistance, and suffered losses.

General conclusion:

  • Ukrainian Defense Forces deal missile strikes on enemy air defense system targets deep within enemy lines on the Lyman and Zaporizhzhia directions.
  • On the Kramatorsk direction, the enemy’s advance is slow, costly, and ineffective due to weather conditions and effective fire from Ukrainian Defense Forces.
  • The enemy achieves an advantage on the Kramatorsk direction by concentrating personnel and military equipment in this sector, continuously rotating troops to maintain high tactical density and an acceptable level of combat capability.
  • The enemy is attempting to push Ukrainian Defense Forces from the Siversk salient as far west as possible to create conditions for an advance toward Siversk, primarily from the east and southeast, and aims to break through toward the area of Kostyantynivka, advancing from Bakhmut along the general direction of the Bakhmut-Pokrovsk road.
  • The key obstacle for Russian forces advancing toward Chasiv Yar from the southeast and east is the Ukrainian stronghold east of the Seversky Donets–Donbas canal near Klishchiivka and Andriivka. This position restricts Russian movement south of the city along the main highway, leading to repeated assaults by the 6th Motorized Rifle Division of the 3rd Army Corps southwest of Ivanivske and along the canal from Kurdyumivka.
  • If the enemy can advance to the Chervone-Stupochky line on the Kramatorsk direction and simultaneously initiate intense offensive actions northward at the juncture of their 41st and 51st Combined Arms Armies from the Novooleksandrivka-Arkhanhelske line, and manage to push forward to the Yablunivka-Oleksandro-Kalynove line on the Toretsk direction, the “Khortytsia” OSG will be forced to withdraw from not only Toretsk but also the surrounding northern areas, potentially retreating toward Kostyantynivka.
  • There are at least three possible scenarios for the enemy’s further actions in the Kramatorsk direction, depending on its success in the adjacent Toretsk and Lyman directions.
  • If the enemy achieves success on the Lyman and Kupyansk directions (for instance, a breakthrough to the Oskil River near Borova) and establishes a northern flank on the Siversk salient along the river north of it, the operational significance of the 3rd Combined Arms Army zone, especially its left flank south of Siversk, will sharply increase in importance, both in relation to this city and to the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk agglomeration.   

Change in the line of contact (LoC):

  • There were 192 combat engagements on various fronts.
  • On the Kursk Direction, “Siversk” OTG advanced west of Borki and launched counterattacks near Novoivanovka, Zelionyi Put, Oleksandriia, Russkaya Konopelka, Plekhovo, and Novyi Put, taking positions south of Kireevka.
  • Russian forces reclaimed positions east of Obukhovka and made advances near Novoivanovka and Plekhovo.
  • On the Kharkiv direction, Russian troops continued offensive actions near Vovchansk and Starytsia but had little success.
  • On the Kupyansk direction, Russian forces moved 2 km forward around Stelmakhivka, now controlling 25% of Kruhlyakivka, and continued their push near Holubivka, Pishchane, Kruhlyakivka, Lozova, Kolisnykivka, Novoosynove, Vyshneve, and Druzhelyubivka.
  • On the Lyman direction, Russian troops conducted assaults near Hrekivka, Katerynivka, Tverdokhlibove, Terny, Zarichne, Torske, and Serebrianka.  
  • On the Siversk direction, Russian forces advanced southwest of Verkhnyokamianske, launching attacks near Vyimka and Ivano-Dariivka, all repelled by Ukrainian Defense Forces.
  • Russian forward units, including the 6th, 7th, 123rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades and 1102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 3rd Army, attempted advances toward Shypylivka-Bilohorivka (upper), Zolotarivka-Verkhnyokamianske, Spirne-Ivano-Dariivka, and Berestove-Vyimka, but gained little since the start of the month.
  • Units of the 85th and 88th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades of the 3rd Army attacked from Rozdolivka-Pereyizne along the railway, and from Sako and Vantsetti toward Mykolaivka along the Bakhmutka River, aiming to reach Fedorivka. However, they failed to break through.
  • On the Kramatorsk direction, Ukrainian Defense Forces reclaimed previously lost positions southeast of Chasiv Yar. Russian forces attempted advances in the forests east of Chasiv Yar, attacking near Predtechyne.
  • In October, forward units of the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade tried to break through near Bohdanivka-Hryhorivka but only achieved minor advances along the “Seversky Donets–Donbas” canal south of Bohdanivka. Actions toward Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Pryvillya were mostly diversionary.
  • Russian forces made modest tactical gains around Chasiv Yar. The 98th Airborne Division and 2nd Separate Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade “Veterans” expanded their foothold near Kalynivka toward Ridkodubya and occupied parts of the “Zhovtnevyi” neighborhood north of Nedohibchenko Street, past the canal.
  • The 98th Airborne Division troops breached a critical point for Chasiv Yar’s defenses, crossing the “Seversky Donets–Donbas” canal and the Bakhmut–Pokrovsk road toward Stupochky, and expanded this breach south of the Dovhe ravine, surrounding the “Novyi,” “Zhovtnevyi,” and central districts of the city. Russian forces are now attempting a southern envelopment of the “Khortytsia” OSG defensive lines around Chasiv Yar with some success.
  • On the Toretsk direction, Ukrainian Defense Forces regained lost positions in the southern parts of Toretsk along Tobolenka Street.
  • Russian forces press forward in Shcherbynivka, launching assaults near Toretsk.
  • On the Pokrovsk direction, the “Volunteer Unit named after Maksym Kryvonos,” reportedly composed of former Ukrainian military members, seized positions near mine #1 northeast of Novohrodivka. Russian troops advanced around Selydove, including its 11th district in the city’s north, moving along Berehova, Central, and Shevchenko streets in the city center and eastern areas. They pushed along the railway toward Vyshneve, east of Kreminska Balka from Tsukuryne, and also toward the eastern edge of Novodmytrivka near Novoselydivka, capturing positions on the western outskirts of Hirnyk and launching attacks near Myrolyubivka, Novotoretske, Vozdvyzhenka, Krutyi Yar, Krasnyi Yar, Lysivka, Sukhyi Yar, Novohrodivka, Marynivka, Mykolaivka, Mykhailivka, Novodmytrivka, Zoryane, Izmailivka, and Novoselydivka.
  • Ukrainian forces are holding their positions in Vyshneve.
  • On the Kurakhove direction, Russian troops pushed south from Heorhiivka and Maksymilianivka, aiming to encircle a Ukrainian Defense Forces’ unit near Hostre.
  • On the Vremivka direction, the enemy continued attacks near Kostyantynivka, Katerynivka, Antonivka, Vodyane, Novoukrainka, and Bohoyavlenka, seeking to advance near Katerynivka, Bohoyavlenka, Vodyane, Vuhledar, and Shakhtarske.
  • On the Orikhiv direction, Russian troops pursued offensives near Novoandriivka and toward Novodanylivka without success. Russian command is transferring additional reserves to the Zaporizhzhia direction, intensifying assault operations, while enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups are probing Ukrainian defenses for vulnerabilities.
  • In the Black Sea-Azov naval operational area, the enemy naval group on combat duty consists of:
    • Black Sea: 1 ship, including 0 cruise missile carriers; the total salvo is 0 cruise missiles.
    • Mediterranean Sea: 2 ships, 2 cruise missile carriers; the total salvo is 24 cruise missiles.

Changes in the enemy disposition:

  • The 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 3rd Combined Arms Army is advancing south of Chasiv Yar.
  • The 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division and the 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 2nd Combined Arms Army are advancing near Selydove.
  • The 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 5th Combined Arms Army is active near Bohoyavlenka, while the 26th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Regiment of the 36th Combined Arms Army operates near Novodonetske.
  • The enemy grouping on the Siversk direction consists of the main forces of the 3rd Combined Arms Army, parts of the 106th Airborne Division, and several formations from the “volunteer assault corps,” and may include up to 26,000 military personnel, 120 tanks, 340 armored fighting vehicles, 230 guns and mortars, and 60 MLRS.
  • On the Kramatorsk direction, the main strike is directed toward Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka by a grouping composed of part of the forces of the 3rd Combined Arms Army, the 3rd Army Corps, the majority of the airborne grouping, the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 14th Army Corps, and the main forces of the “volunteer assault corps.” This grouping may number up to 50,000 personnel, 240 tanks, 810 armored fighting vehicles, 530 guns and mortars, and 130 multiple-launch rocket systems.

Possible operation situation developments:

  • The command of the enemy’s 25th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade on the Kupyansk direction in the near future will attempt to advance eastward and cut off all roads leading to Synkivka from the south, reach the Oskil River across from the village of Holubivka on the right bank, in order to force the “Khortytsia” OSG forward units defending in the Synkivka area to retreat towards Petropavlivka.
  • The command of the enemy’s “Zapad (West”) Operational Grouping will intensify efforts on the Lyman direction to ensure the advance of the 25th Combined Arms Army to the Borova–Lyman line. The goal is to assist in the elimination of the Siversk bridgehead held by the Ukrainian Defense Forces and create favorable conditions for the eventual capture of the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration by the end of this year.
  • The enemy’s military command in the theater of operations within the following 2-3 months will concentrate its efforts on achieving the military-political goal of the Special Military Operation: reaching the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. For this purpose, they will maximize their advance towards Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad, in the direction of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, and aiming to reach the junction of Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk Oblasts near the village of Temyrivka.
  • By the end of this year, the enemy will not only fail to occupy Donetsk Oblast within its administrative borders but also will be unable to seize the “fortress belt” of Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk. The upcoming battle for Pokrovsk will be the climax of the enemy’s offensive operation in the Southwestern Theater of Operations in 2024. October and partially November become the moment of maximum tension for both sides in the entire 2024 campaign.
  • The enemy has reached a line approximately 7.5-8 km from the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, making it entirely possible that the Russian military command may attempt to bypass Kostyantynivka and penetrate the defenses on its outskirts through multiple frontal assaults along the shortest route. All significant changes and regroupings of enemy forces from the “Yug (South)” Operational Grouping should be continuously monitored.

Russian operational losses from 24.02.22 to 26.10.24  

Personnel – almost 687,600 (+1,690); 

Tanks 9,109 (+12);

Armored combat vehicles – 18,332 (+45); 

Artillery systems – 19,782 (+29);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) – 1,240 (+2);

Anti-aircraft warfare systems – 984 (+2);

Vehicles and fuel tanks – 27,460 (+95);

Aircraft – 369 (0);

Helicopters – 329 (0);

UAV operational and tactical level – 17,726 (+56);

Intercepted cruise missiles – 2625 (0)

Boats/ships – 29 (0).

Humanitarian + general:

  • In the early hours of October 26, Russia launched a combined missile and drone strike on Ukraine. Air defense systems destroyed 44 enemy drones, while 44 others were lost from radar. Russia used three Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, two Kh-59 guided air missiles, two unidentified missiles, and 91 drones. Missiles struck civilian infrastructure in Sumy Oblast and Dnipro.
  • On the evening of October 25, the Russian army launched attack drones from the north targeting Kyiv. One apartment in a residential building in Kyiv caught fire, resulting in the death of a teenage girl and injuries to six residents.
  • A Russian strike on a residential building in Dnipro on the evening of October 25 killed five people, including the wife and daughter of a police officer. Twenty-one people were injured, four of them children. Police received 217 reports of property damage.
  • During a nighttime drone attack on Kyiv Oblast, a woman was killed, and a child was injured. Firefighters extinguished two fires, and a private home was damaged.
  • On the morning of October 26, Russian forces shelled the village of Borova in the Borova territorial community of Kharkiv Oblast, killing one woman and damaging seven private houses.
  • At night, the enemy again targeted Shahed attack drones at the city of Starokostiantyniv. A hotel and residential areas came under fire, causing fires that were quickly extinguished by emergency responders.
  • Around 12:40 a.m. on October 26, Russian troops dropped explosives from a drone in Kindiyka, near Kherson, killing a man. At around 2:40 a.m., artillery struck Bilozerka, hitting a home. The body of a woman was recovered from the rubble. Russian forces also shelled Kherson overnight, critically injuring a man who was inside his home during the attack.
  • At approximately 11:40 a.m., Russian troops shelled the village of Radkove in Chuhuiv District, Kharkiv Oblast, hitting a private house and killing a civilian man.
  • At 3:40 p.m. Russian forces dropped two air bombs on Kostyantynivka, resulting in fatal injuries to a 38-year-old local resident. Additionally, a man and two women suffered blast and concussion injuries.
  • During the afternoon of October 26, Russian forces shelled Stanislav in Kherson Oblast, killing two people and injuring five others.
  • At 6:44 p.m., the Air Force warned of a ballistic weapon threat from the south. At 6:46 p.m., the Odesa Oblast Governor reported an explosion in Odesa.

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